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Committee takes a programmatic approach to Defense Authori-
zations. The examination demonstrates that, although there
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lies in the area of programmatic activity. Further, the
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The research effort and methodology embodied in this
thesis were directed towards analyzing the budgetary behav-
ior of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). The spe-
cific area of interest was the annual authorization of
appropriations for Defense Procurement. The analysis covers
the period fiscal year 1968 through fiscal year 1974, and
the primary research method was that of Content Analysis
(CA).
Examination of the SASC was undertaken for two reasons.
First, during the past several years the size and content of
the Defense portion of the Federal budget has been the tar-
get of increasing criticism, scrutiny and challenge from
both congressional and non-congressional sources. This
critical atmosphere has resulted in an expanded awareness of
the number and magnitude of sophisticated, high- cost weapons
systems being developed and procured by the Department of
Defense (DOD).
A direct adjunct of the above environment has been an in-
creased effort to insure better requirements definition and
program management on the part of the DOD components. The
annual authorization hearings have thus become the primary
setting in which the services, via program or project manag-
ers and/or their staffs, must justify their programs. Hence,
it is necessary to understand the functioning and interests

of the committees before which the service representatives
must testify.
The second reason this particular committee was chosen
follows from the first. The majority of efforts, which have
focused on examining congressional oversight of the budgetary
process, have been directed towards the appropriations com-
mittees of the two houses, or to Congress as a whole. As a
result, there is a noticeable paucity of information per-
taining to the singular characteristics of the SASC. As will
be shown below, this committee has exhibited an increasing
interest in service programs and a definite concern with
management aspects relating to cost control. Perhaps even
more important is the potential this committee retains for
influencing major defense programs ana overall defense policy
Research design and methodology centered on the content
analysis of explicit decision behavior. The approach to
analysis and the pertinent findings are discussed in section
V. Finally, the concluding section contains recommendations
for further study.
Implicit in this research is the assumption that the
reader has a thorough understanding of the annual budgetary
process. For this reason, a lengthy, detailed explanation
of the budgetary process, per se, was purposely omitted.






The major thrust of this thesis was directed towards an
analysis of the budgetary behavior of the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee. More specifically, using the Content Analy-
sis approach, an effort was made to determine whether the
committee has exhibited a predominately fiscal or program-
matic tendency in their consideration of the annual authori-
zation requests.
The definition of Fiscal and Programmatic behavior was
basic to the investigation. In a recent article in Naval
War College Revi ew, Professor Lawrence J. Korb set forth the
relevant definitions that provided a basis for reference
[Ref. 12].
The two hypotheses are opposing in nature. For example,
the Fiscal hypothesis holds that Congress approaches the De-
fense budget with a goal of eliminating waste and increasing
managerial effectiveness. The result is a congressional
tendency to make percentage or across-the-board reductions
in the budget. The desired goal is to reduce the overall
level of defense spending and reductions are made without
consideration of the effects on overall program composition.
On the other hand, the Programmatic hypothesis contends
that, in fact, Congress is less concerned with total spend-
ing and more concerned with individual programs. The end
result of this type of behavior would be io shape defense

programs, strengthen the force structure, determine the
types and numbers of weapons systems, etc. Moves to influ-
ence programs or related areas would thus be based on policy
motives, and should reflect an attempt, by Congress or the
committee concerned, to impose its "imprint" on National De-
fense viz-z-viz the authorization process.
B. SURVEY OF LITERATURE
There are numerous studies which have been directed
towards analyzing Congressional spending behavior. The ap-
proaches which have been employed are equally varied. Con-
gress has been examined as a whole in an effort to determine
their impact on spending. There have been several in-depth
studies, using quantitative techniques, the goal of which was
to establish stable patterns of behavior and furnish a pre-
dictive tool to assess future orientations. Finally, some
studies have focused on sociological and structural charac-
teristics of the various committees in an effort to explain
congressional activity. The studies cited below are pre-
sented in an effort to orient the reader to various approaches
and conclusions with respect to the Fiscal-Programmatic di-
lemma. The material is intended to provide a limited review
of literature that might be used as a starting point for
further research and additional information on Congressional
behavior.
1 • The Fiscal Hypothesis
Lawrence Korb, in "Congressional Impact on Defense
Spending, 19G2 - 1973: The Programmatic and F J seal Hypothesis,"
10

examined Congressional changes to the Defense portion of the
Federal budget on an aggregate level. Korb used a compara-
tive approach and cited four measures or standards that were
used to gauge the fiscal impact of Congressional activity;
the five per cent standard of significance suggested by
Richard Fenno [Ref. 7, p. 353]; the historical impact of Con-
gress prior to 1962; the impact of the executive branch
(those reductions made by Secretary of Defense and the Presi-
dent); and the impact of Congress in the non-defense areas
of the Federal budget [Ref. 12, p. 51].
Korb ' s examination was centered around a breakdown
of the Department of Defense budget into separate appropria-
tion titles, (Personnel, O&M, Procurement, RDT&E). Ke then
examined the magnitude of Congressional changes to the budget
request within these titles and applied Fenno' s five per cent
measure of significance.
Korb concluded that the fiscal impact of Congress
was less than significant until 1970. From 1970 until 1973
there is evidence of increasing Congressional interest and
activity and during this period the fiscal impact was signif-
icant. For example, during the period FY 1970-FY 1973 Con-
gress reduced the defense spending on an average of 5.35%
[Ref. 12, p. 53]
.
The programmatic impact was considered to be more
"shadow than substance." The primary reasons for this con-
clusion were that, although activity from FY 1962 to FY 1973
was concentrated primarily in the Procurement and RDT&E
11

titles, Congress (1) seldom cancelled a weapon system and
(2) chose to concentrate activity within these areas because
of political feasibility [Ref. 12, p. 59,60].
Similar conclusions were reached by Carol F. Goss.
In her dissertation, Goss stipulated that Congressional in-
fluence on procurement could be examined at three different
levels — procedural, fiscal and substantive [Ref. 8, p. 356]
Taken here, Goss' procedural and fiscal levels coincide with
the Fiscal hypothesis, and actions at the substantive level
are considered to be programmatic in nature. She examined
decision making structure and behavior within the appropria-
tions and authorizations committees, among others, and con-
cluded that "participation in substantive policy . . . has been
intermittent and b T7 and lar cT e not very eff^^tive " TRpf . <>
p. 404]. Hence, her research tends to support the fiscal
hypothesis for Congressional activity during the late sixties
Richard Fenno's definitive work, The Power of the
Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress
,
was directed
primarily at a study of non-defense budget activity at an
aggregate level [Ref. 7]. The thrust of Fenno's findings
was that Congress acts in a fiscal or incremental manner
towards non-defense spending.
In a thesis entitled An Analysis of the Budgetary
Behavior of the House Appropriations Committee on Defense
Proc uremen t [Ref. 14], Leo A. Lukenas examined specific com-
mittee behavior and addressed the fiscal-programmatic con-




He concluded that the direction of the House Appropriations
Defense Subcommittee behavior, during the period FY 1970 to
FY 1973, was fiscal in nature. Lukenas points to the fact
that committee action was primarily oriented towards program
progress and costs, thereby supporting the Korb and Goss
findings [Ref. 14, p. 44-47]. He did, however, note that
the role played by the authorizing committees showed an in-
creasingly programmatic orientation during this period.
Further support for the fiscal hypothesis was given
by Wildavsky, Davis and Dempster [Ref. 4]. In "A Theory of
the Budgetary Process," 56 non-defense agencies of the U.S.
Government were examined. An effort was made to establish a
mathematical model which would explain Congressional deci-
SI n^.. rv> n In* >-% *-*• tt»-i 4" Vn -» y-% tto -v» -i /-> i i r~* *-» *-\ vyn rv -i 4- 4- *-\ *-> r-« «-»«--* 4- l~i *"* "» "^ -v» f> T T "* s~\**t r^ r^ «-» «r /~* *-» f> t t
requests. Their research suggests that Congressional actions
result in aggregate decisions which closely follow simple
linear models that are stable over time. Further, partici-
pants in the budgetary process use "aids" which are primarily
"incremental" in nature. Additionally, they hold that deci-
sion-makers tend to think in terms of percentage reductions.
2 . The Programmatic Hypothesis
The literature cited thus far has revealed primary
evidence thax Congress approaches the Federal budget with
the intent of reducing spending. This is accomplished either
by across-the-board reductions or selected "cuts" in politi-
cally expedient areas. There are those, however, who sup-
port the opposite or programmatic view.
13

Professor Edward J. Laurance, in his doctoral dis-
sertation, examined the changing role of Congress in defense
policy-making [Ref. 13]. His in-depth study pointed to a
definite change from a "rubber-stamp" Congress, during the
period 1947 to 1967, to a Congress more concerned with poli-
cy and issues during the 1967 - 1971 time frame. He contends
that this transformation was "systemic" in nature and alludes
to the idea that this has resulted in changes which point to
a more programmatic or policy motivated Congress. This is
especially true with respect to the SASC. As support for
these findings, Laurance includes evidence such as: (1) de-
creased "rubber-stamp" activity on defense issues, (2)
"budget shaping" during committee debates on defense policy,
V_ u J iutiCttocu i^ii^ l- iji w-l i.^ui j.u o ^j.a. .. n ^ p^I I U-L C'.-O'^ , WIIJLCI2
include strategic and structural issues, and (4) increased
floor debate and amendments during the Senate authorization
process [Ref. 13, p. 126].
Still another proponent of the programma.tic hypothe-
sis is Arnold Kanter. Ranter's extensive quantitative anal-
ysis, "Congress and the Defense Budget: 1960 - 1970,"
challenges the inference that, because studies in non-defense
areas have shown a fiscal approach on the part of Congress,
this approach is equally applied to defense areas. There-
fore, he orients his study toward the defense authorization
and appropriations process. Specifically, Kanter ' s analysis
focused on the floor action in both the House and Senate
during defense debates. The information derived was compared
14

to appropriation outcomes and formed the basis for the study.
His conclusion was that, of the two approaches to explaining
budgetary activity in the defense area, the Congress exhibits
both a programmatic and fiscal orientation. However, he
feels that the programmatic explanation has the greatest
significance for defense policy [Ref. 11].
C. BACKGROUND SUMMARY
The above cited references suggest areas for further re-
search. Specifically, there is a noticeable lack of specific
committee analysis, with the exception of Defense appropria-
tions. There are several instances where cursory discussion
is directed towards the role of the Armed Services committees
As a whole, however, the research dwells on aggregate or
overall levels of the budget, the Congress as an entity, and
activity in non-defense areas of the Federal budget.
Of specific importance is the fact that it is generally
conceded that the Congress as a body accepts the "expertise"
of, and generally follows, the recommendations of the four-
major military committees that are involved with defense
authorizations and appropriations, (House and Senate Armed
Services, House and Senate Appropriations). "Specialization
is a virtue nurtured by committees and subcommittees, and
specialization and attention to detail are highly regarded
in Congress," [Ref. 2, p. 149, 150]. The military committees
are recognized as being the most influential in military af-
fairs and policy, and some have stated that the authorizing
15

committees have the greatest potential for influencing de-
fense programs and policy [Ref. 2, p. 150; Ref. 8, p. 368].
It was primarily for these reasons and weaknesses that this
thesis concentrated on the SASC.
16

Ill . THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE A.ND CONGRESS
Fundamental to any understanding of the SASC is a brief
examination of committee origin, structure, and a cursory
review of the growth in committee power and influence.
A . GENERAL .
In 1945, as a response to expanding governmental power
and ill-defined Congressional relationships, the Lafollette
Committee submitted recommendations calling for a reorganiza-
tion of the Congress. The Lafollette recommendations pro-
vided the basis for the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946. Among other things, this Act provided for a reduction
--- -A-T-*- «...
— i~ *^-m „ -C m-i-ams^-Sv*.— ~^»-^,~-;-~--~~^ -: « o^-*.^--*,,^^-.^-. 117 -; -*- V-. -5 « -*-- i~ ^
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Senate, the Naval Affairs and Military Affairs Committees
,
were consolidated to form the Committee on Armed Services.
This Committee was charged, in broad terms, with jurisdiction
over areas of common defense and the armed forces in general.
B. MEMBERSHIP
Table I is an historical review of the committee member-
ship during the period of this research. As reflected in
the table, the number of members, which is determined by the
Senate, has r ained fairly constant. Additionally, the
membership of the six ranking majority members and three of
the four minority members has remained unchanged since 19




SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP
(1967 - 1973)
67 68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73
Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.)
John Stennis (D-Miss.)
Stuart Symington (D-Mo.)
Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.)
Sam J. Erwin, Jr. (D-N.C.)
Howard W. Cannon (D-Nev.)
Robt. C. Byrd (D-W.Va.)
Stephen M. Young (D-Ohio)
Daniel K. Inouye (D-Haw.)
Thorn. J. Mclntyre (D-N.H.)
Daniel E. Brevet or (D-Md.)
Harry F. Byrd (D-Vermont)
Margaret C. Smith (R-Me.)
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Jack Miller (R-Iowa)
John G. Tower (R-Tex.)
James B. Pearson (R-Kans.)
Peter H. Dominick (R-Colo.)
George Murphy (R-Calif.)
Ed. W. Brooke (R-Mass.)
Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.)
Harold Hughes (D-Iowa)
Lloyd M. Rentsen (D-Tex.)
Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)
William B. Saxbe (R-Ohio)
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
Wm. Lloyd Scott (R-Va.)
(Data from: Congressional Directory , GPO, Wash., D. C. , 1967-1973.
)
A * A A
* * A A A A A
* A A A A A A
* A A A A A A
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* A A A A A A
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averaged 7.4%. This low turnover has provided a base for
continuity, increased committee expertise and, further pro-
vides an indication of the desirability of committee member-
ship. One possible explanation for this relative committee
stability is the seniority ranking of the SASC. At the time
of this writing the average committee seniority, in years of
Senate service, was 13.8 years.
C. SASC AND THE AUTHORIZATIONS PROCESS
It is within the authorizations arena that the SASC dis-
plays the greatest potential for shaping defense policy or
influencing specific program outcomes. As mentioned above,
the four "military committees" are the most influential in
altering the Defense budget. During the annual authorizing
and appropriations process, the House and Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committees must review the administration's defense re-
quests, item-by-item, and establish the limits within which
2
appropriations must fall. Therefore, the Armed Services
Committees have the legislative wherewithal to constrain the
Appropriations Committees and to cancel or change the direc-
tion of individual defense programs as desired. However, as
will be shown below, the realities of the Congressional
process do not reflect a major assertion of this power.
Seniority data extracted from An Analysis of the Senate
Armed Services Committee , CDR L.C. Eastman, et . al., NPGS
Paper, 1974.
o
For an excellent discussion of the fiscal/budgetary




The potential of the SASC, in the area of Procurement
and RDT&E, may be easily demonstrated in terms of New Obli-
gational Authority. Figure 1 is a comparative breakdown of
New Budget authority recommended for the FY 1968 and 1974
budgets. For Procurement, $22.9 billion and $18.8 billion
were recommended for 1968 and 1974 respectively. Of these
amounts 60 per cent required authorization in FY 1968 and 71
per cent required SASC approval in FY 1974. Thus, today the
role, or at least the potential role, of the SASC is mani-
festly one of power. This was not always the case.
NOA COMPARISON
FY New Budget Authority NOA Recommended NOA RequiringRecommended for DOD for Procurement Authorization
1968 $74.7 B $22.9 B $13.8 B (60%)
1974 $83.5 B $18.8 B $13.4 B (71%)
NOA = New Obligational Authority
(Source, The Budget
,
FY 1968, FY 1974)
Figure 1
D. THE CHANGING PERSPECTIVE
The role the SASC played, during its first fifteen years
of legislative oversight, was essentially one of scrutiniz-
ing requests for military construction. Authorizations in
this area were closely watched and completed on a line item
basis. It was during this period (1946 - 1961) that the
Armed Services Committees of both houses of Congress were
known as the "real estate" committees. Until the late
20

fifties, the SASC merely reviewed plans for developing and
procuring weapons systems. Authorizations for these areas
were made on a continuing basis and it was the Appropriations
Committees who actually authorized and appropriated funds
for specific military programs.
The involvement of the SASC has changed in recent years.
From 1959 to present there has been a steady expansion of
power within the Armed Services Committee in the area of Pro-
curement and RDT&E. The fountainhead of this expansion was
the introduction of the Russell Amendment during considera-
tion of the FY 1960 Military Construction bill. This amend-
ment, designated Section 412 (b), was a deliberate attempt
to alter the balance of power in Congress with respect to
onQgetary concrox. j.he amendment "»vas po±icy- oncrioCCt a;ic
specifically directed towards the area of defense weapons
programs [Ref. 5, p. 42]. As incorporated in the Military
Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal 1960, Senator-
Russell's rider called for expanding the role of the Armed
Services Committee such that:
"No funds may be appropriated after December
31, 1960, to or for use of any armed force of the
United States for the procurement of aircraft, mis-
siles, or naval vessels unless the appropriation
of such funds has been authorized by legislation
enacted after such data." [Ref. 15]
Subsequent amendments and passage of Public laws have
expanded the original Section 412 (b) to include required
authorization for appropriations in the following areas:
21

1) "... all research, development, test, or eval-
uation carried on by the Department of Defense."
[Ref. 16]
2) "... for the procurement of tracked combat ve-
hicles." [Ref. 17]
3) "... personnel strengths of each of the Selected
Reserves of the Reserve components..." [Ref. 18]
4) "... for the procurement of other weapons to or
for the use of any armed force of the United
States." [Ref. 19]
5) "... for the use of the Navy for the procurement
of torpedoes and related support equipment..."
[Ref. 20]
Thus, the increased scope of the SASC was seen as an at-
tempt to open the door to a more active role in shaping de-
fense policy. Raymond H. Dawson held that this role was
made possible by (1) more utility of focus , a narrower exam-
ination of defense programs by the Armed Services Committee
as opposed to the wide range of line-items examined by Ap-
propriations Committees; (2) a greater access by the commit-
tee to Defense issues and conflicts within the DOD; and (3)
as a result of (1) and (2) an expanded base of knowledge
,
whereby the Committee could gain increased expertise and
knowledge in heretofore "closed" areas of National Security
[Ref. 5, p. 301,302]. Whether or not this increased activity
in the program or policy areas, has been realized is a point
to be discussed below.
E. SUBCOMMITTEES AND STAFFS
It is difficult to assess the role played by the subcom-
mittees and their staffs within the authorizations process.
22

Indeed, it is suggested that such an assessment could well
be the subject of an independent research effort. There are,
however, certain conclusions that may be inferred from ex-
plicit facts pertinent to these areas.
First, as is evident from an examination of Table II,
the proliferation of subcommittees of the SASC is impressive.
From two subcommittees in 1967, the number has grown to a
total of twelve in 1974. The total number reached a peak of
14 in 1972.
The parent committee is responsible for creating the
necessary subcommittees to conduct hearings, inquiries and
investigations required to augment the Committee's legisla-
tive function. Thus, since the SASC is primarily concerned
with programs of a military nature, it can be infprrpd that
subcommittee expansion was a manifest result of increased
activity and scrutiny by the SASC in the area of military
authorizations
.
During this same time frame, the number of professional
staff members increased from nine in 1967, to 26 in 1973
[Ref. 1] . This increase might be explained as the result of
two associated events. First, the increased number of sub-
committees would almost certainly result in increased admin-
istrative, research and investigative requirements, thereby
necessitating additional staff augmentation. Secondly, the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 changed the number of
permanent professional staffs for standing committees and
authorized the hiring of temporary consultants [Ref. 3],
23
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The actual impact of the Congressional Staff on policy, which




IV. APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
A . METHODOLOGY
Once the area of research had been reduced to an examin-
ation of the SASC and their budgetary behavior, it was then
necessary to consider the design for research. Various
schemes were considered but the most suitable seemed to be
that of content analysis (CA).
Content analysis is by no means a new approach to objec-
tive investigation. Articles pertaining to the use of CA
date back to the early forties. However, since the bulk of
the background on CA was obtained from Holsti, it is his
general statement that is considered germane; "... content
analysis is the application of scientific methods to docu-
mentary evidence," [Ref. 9, p. 5]. Specific examples of the
application of this method may be found in works by Sharkansky
[Ref. 22] and Jernberg [Ref. 10].
Basically, the methodology used herein followed a re-
search design similar to that put forth by Holsti [Ref. 9,
p. 26] . The objective was to draw conclusions as to motives
behind communicated messages in an effort to determine pre-
dominate committee behavior. The overall effort involved
(1) identification of documentary material that was held to
represent an accurate, explicit indication of committee be-
havior, (2) isolation of some unit of analysis that could be
categorized for further analysis, (3) development of
26

appropriate categories for use with the unit of analysis
and (4) inferences based on the above processes.
B. SOURCE DOCUMENTS
The bulk of the analysis concentrated on data extracted
from the Reports of the Senate Committee on Armed Services
for defense authorizations during the period of FY 1968 to
FY 1974 [Refs. 23-29]. These documents were chosen for the
below cited reasons:
1. Document Importance
As is generally accepted, the Congress as a whole is
time-constrained. It is therefore reasonable to assume that,
in the area of Procurement authorizations, the Senate has
neither the time nor resources to devote to an in-depth re-
view of several volumes of hearings. If it is further as-
sumed that the decision-making process, which culminates in
a chamber vote, is rational then it may be concluded that
the published Reports of the various committees serve as
primary reference documents for non-committee members of the
Senate. Additionally, the Senate has exhibited a marked
tendency to accept SASC recommendations for Defense Authori-
zations. These two arguments led to the decision to draw
the "units of analysis" from the Report.
3 During the period examined, the final Senate passed
authorization was the same as that recommended by the SASC




Time constraints and research resources also favored
the use of the Report . Whereas the published testimony of
the hearings before the SASC consisted of several volumes of
considerable length, the Report involves only a single docu-
ment which appears to capsulize the important "decisions"
made during the hearings.
3. Document Accessibility
Finally, the Reports are maintained as part of the
aggregate government documents at any official depository.
As such, they are readily accessible for reference.
In addition to Senate Reports
,
the Congressional
Quarterly Almanac was of considerable value. The Almanac
was used to answer questions relating to final authorization
amounts, appropriations and to resolve issues that were
vague or ambiguous in the Report .
C. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
A survey of CA literature and applications affirms the
fact that much of the inventiveness of the technique used
necessarily depends on the document and the analyst. How-
ever, Hoist i contends that the vast majority of CA works
have utilized one of five major units of analysis for coding
[Ref. 9, p. 116, 177]. Of the five he discusses, the unit
most descriptive of the work herein would be the "theme."
Taken here, the theme was the context or explicit reason
surrounding the unit of analysis that was finally coded.




it was possible to make an assertion as to the motives or
circumstances underlying the actions of the committee and
assign each action or "decision" to an appropriate category
as described below.
Once the appropriate Reports were obtained, it was nec-
essary to examine the contents and isolate the final unit of
analysis for coding. Following an initial survey of the
Reports
,
it became obvious that the "decision" was the ap-
propriate unit to be used. It was then necessary to define
"decision" and develop category boundaries for coding the
data in question.
1 . Unit of Analysis
For the purposes of this research, a "decision" was
considered to be those actions which met the following cri-
teria.
a) Recommendat ions in reference to major weapons
programs as expressed in the discussion sections of the Re-
ports . (e.g. The areas addressed under the heading of
"Committee Actions and Views," FY '68, '69, '70, '71 and
"Aspects of Bill of Special Interest," FY '72, '73, '74.)
These recommendations involved approvals, deletions and
transfers of money between titles.
b) Changes in dollar amounts (+ and - ) as reflected
in the line items or elements of tables within the Reports .
(e.g. Title - Procurement, Line Item - Army Aircraft, Ele-
ment - AH-56 Cheyene, $-12.0 Million.)
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It is pointed out that the recommendations discussed
under "Views" or "Special Interest" were considered to be
decisions even though, in some cases, no dollar changes were
involved. Additionally, all changes and discussions relating
to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program were purposely
omitted. Finally, the Southeast Asia Amendment, considered
in the FY 1973 Report, was not considered germane and there-
fore was omitted from the analysis.
Those actions which met the above criteria and ex-
ceptions were recorded and considered to be explicit indica-
tions of Committee behavior and interests.
2. Category Development
Perhaps the most important part of the CA methodol-
ogy is that of category definition and refinement. Holsti
[Ref. 9] was used almost exclusively for reference in this
area. The categories serve the purpose of guiding the ana-
lyst and coder and must provide a means for placement of the
units of analysis.
Category definitions must meet two major criteria.
They must be both valid and precise. Validity is essential
in order to accurately reflect the analyst's concepts and
allow bias-free coding of the author's concepts. Precision
is necessary to allow independent coding of the units under
investigation based on the judgment of the coding personnel.
Further restrictions on category construction involve
the application of tests of exhaustiveness , mutual exclusive-





a) Exhaustive Categories . Definition should be
such that all data examined is capable of being placed into
one of the categories defined.
b) Mutually Exclusive Categories . Definition should
be such that the coder is guided to place data into only one
of the categories in use.
c) Independence . Coding of data in a single cate-
gory should not influence the classification of other data.
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V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
A. ANALYSIS
After the basic research criteria were established, anal-
ysis was begun. The analysis consisted of five sequential
stages. In order of completion it involved initial data re-
cording, category definition, decision coding, pretesting
and category refinement, and data reduction.
1. Initial Data Recording
An in-depth examination of the procurement section
of each Senate Report was completed. During this process
changes and recommendations
,
which were considered to repre-
sent "decisions" as defined above, were recorded on work-
sheets. The theme, or information pertinent to the decision,
was also recorded. This included the amount of change in-
volved, major weapon program or equipment affected and,
wherever possible, key words and phrases which appeared to
represent explicit reasons underlying Committee act j on.
Much emphasis was placed on this stage of the analysis in
order to gain an overall appreciation for the "context" of
the actions as well as familiarity with content. This was a
necessary preface to category definition and further analy-
sis .
2. Category Definition
Through use of the criteria of mutual exclusiveness
,
independence and exhaust iveness , and key words and phrases
associated with the recorded decision, eleven categories
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covering both Fiscal and Programmatic behavior were defined,
The initial set of definitions were intended to allow "cod-
ing", or assignment of each decision to a single category.
Eventually, the original eleven categories were reduced to
the three broad categories and appropriate subcategories as
defined below. Figure 2 schematically depicts the process
of category reduction and the final results,
a. Programmatic Category
This category included those decisions that re-
flected Committee efforts to shape defense programs or spe-
cific weapons systems to conform to policy views or desired
Committee goals viz-a-viz National Defense. Decisions in
this category were coded under one of the following subcate-
gGr 1G3.
(1) Dev e lopmental . Those changes to programs
as a result of the following types of action: premature re-
quests for procurement (development incomplete); problems
referred to as "technical," "developmental," "redesign,"
etc.; express committee desire for additional development;
schedule slippage resulting from technical/developmental
difficulties
.
(2) Military Programs . Those changes to, or
approval of, funds requests associated with the following
reasons: force modernization or expressed desire for techni-
cally improving equipment considered obsolete or inadequate
to meet a threat; actions specifically referred to as stra-
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strategic programs, (e.g. manned bomber, ICBM, FBM, NORAD )
;
actions motivated by or initiated to meet an opposing tacti-
cal threat, (e.g. fighter superiority, fleet air defense,
missile defense).
(3) Foreign Policy . Those changes to, or ap-
proval of, funds requests associated with actions such as:
expressed concern for possible or actual effects of defense
policy as related to international treaties, commitments,
alliances or perceived role of United States in international
context; efforts directed towards maintaining an independent
technology base.
b. Fiscal Category
This category included those decisions which
goals. The major effort or goal of these actions would be
directed towards a reduction in defense spending. The below
defined subcategories were used.
(1) Incorrect Requests . Those funds requests
that were considered by the Committee to be under the wrong
title, line item or element.
(2) No Reason . The analysis assumed a ''worst
case" and if no reason for change was given the decision was
coded as fiscal.
(3) Management Oriented . Those actions asso-
ciated with efforts aimed at achieving the following results:
improving overall management of specific programs; reducing
cost growth within a particular program; prohibiting system
35

duplication; implementing express management policy; reduc-
ing reprogramming actions; maintaining production or technol-
ogy base.
(4) Cost Effectiveness . Changes to, or approval
of, funds requests associated with those actions that: in-
creased a specific capability for reduced program costs;
reduced costs with no perceived decrease in capability: di-
rected use of comparable system components for same mission;
encouraged multilateral service procurement of similar equip-
ment; reduced requests due to "limited capability" of asso-
ciated equipment.
c. Other
Those changes or recommendations resulting from
expressed views by Secretary Defense, Service Chiefs, Service
Secretaries or the "Services." Generally included in this
category are reduced or revised "requirements" and program
cancellations. This was originally coded as DOD action.
3. Data Coding
Using the eleven original categories, as depicted in
Figure 2, the decisions listed in Appendix A were coded or
assigned to a category. Assignment was based on the category
definition which most closely coincided with the explicit
language or reasons given for the change. Although the final
category and subcategory definitions above differ somewhat





4 . Pretesting and Category Refinement
Once the decisions were recorded and coded using the
original eleven category definitions it was necessary to
test the validity of the effort. This was accomplished by
means of an independent pretest.
A person disassociated with the research was briefed
on the objectives of the thesis, the method to be used for
coding, original category definitions and the material from
which the decisions were extracted. The coder was then
asked to choose a minimum of twenty-five random decisions
from the list in Appendix A. Using the page reference, the
Senate Reports and the eleven category definitions, he was
asked to code the selected decisions.
In all thirty— two decisions were coded dur^n 0, th<^
pretest. The results were then compared to the decisions
coded by the author in order to ascertain the percentage of
agreement. The raw results indicated agreement in fifteen
of the thirty-two decisions compared. This equated to 47
per cent
.
In each case where the two coding efforts were not
in consonance, the author reviewed the decision and original
category assignment. In four cases the original coding was
considered in error and changed to agree with the independent
effort. This review resulted in a new level of agreement of
57 per cent
.
Finally, category refinement was undertaken. This
was necessary in order to arrive at two general categories
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which would allow a Fiscal and Programmatic dichotomy to be
drawn. The refinement has been illustrated in Figure 2 and
consisted of using subcategorization as a means of expanding
two basic definitions. Once the refinement process was com-
plete, the coding could be accomplished using Fiscal, Pro-
grammatic and Other as the basic categories.
Using the final general categories, a third compari-
son of the original coding and the pretest results was made.
The agreement level increased to seventy-one per cent. The
marked increase was attributed to the expanded definition
parameters, and was also considered to be a more accurate
representation of category validity.
B. DATA REDUCTION AND FINDINGS
Once the decisions had been recorded and category assign-
ments made, Appendix A was completed. All decisions used in
the analysis, the service branch and equipment involved, the
amount of change and the appropriate page number of the Sen-
ate Report were recorded for reference. Additionally, each
decision was coded using the initial eleven categories and
the final three as described above. The findings that fol-
low, along with the attendant tabular and graphical data,
were in large part drawn from Appendix A.
1 . Fiscal vs . Programmatic Behavior Within the SASC
The major effort of this thesis, as stated at the
beginning, was directed towards an attempt to discern whether
or not the SASC has exhibited a predominately Fiscal or Pro-
grammatic behavior when addressing the annual Defense
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Authorization request. The following findings are offered
in response to that objective.
Table III is the numerical tally of the actions, or
decisions, as coded in Appendix A. Based on the resulting
totals, Figure 3 was constructed in order to reflect the
overall weight of each subcategory and give an indication of
the percentage of actions which were considered Fiscal, Pro-
grammatic and Other.
As reflected in Table III and Figure 3, the total
number of actions within the various subcategories was 165.
Of this number 88 were coded Fiscal (subcategory IR + PM +
CE + FI ) . This yielded an overall Fiscal percentage of 53.3
The corresponding total of those decisions coded as Program-
matic (subcategory FP + DEV + FM + SP + TP) was 57. This
total equated to 34.6 per cent of those actions examined.
The remainder of the decisions, 20, were coded as DOD under
Other. Thus, the predominant behavior, when examined as
total decisional activity, appeared to be Fiscal in nature.
Figure 4 graphically illustrates the data recorded
in Table III and was constructed to determine trends of ac-
tivity, by Fiscal year, during the period examined. It is
important to note two characteristics reflected in this
graph. First, the peaks of activity in FY 1971 and FY 1974
tend to make the overall percentage of actions greater.
However, if one examines Programmatic activity, by Fiscal
year, the picture of Fiscal predominance is somewhat dimin-
ished. Indeed, the Fiscal action is greater in only four of
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The second peculiar characteristic is directly re-
lated to the first. The overall trend of Programmatic activ-
ity is one of a steadily increasing nature. This could well
be a reflection of a growing interest and concern, on the
part of the SASC, with the structure of defense policy and
programs. Further, this trend might well be an indication
of future motivation and behavior that can be expected.
Table IV reflects Fiscal and Programmatic trends as
expressed in absolute dollar totals. The breakdown includes
the absolute amount, by fiscal year, of all actions coded F
and P in Appendix A. Figure 5 is a graphical representation
of the same information.
Of major significance is the fact that in each fis-
cal yectr the number of Programmatic actions was either less
than those coded Fiscal or at least very nearly equal. How-
ever, the absolute dollar amounts of the actions involved
differed significantly. For example, in FY 1971 there were
27 Fiscal actions which involved an absolute amount of
$985.8 million. During the same period there were only nine
Programmatic actions coded but the dollar total addressed
was $2.3 billion. Hence, although the number of Fiscal ac-
tions exceeded those of a Programmatic nature by a factor of
3, the absolute value of the Fiscal actions was 60 per cent
less.
The above findings suggest that, although there are
a greater overall number of Fiscal actions initiated by the
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comes through Programmatic activity. These findings in them-
selves should not present any surprise as the actions involv-
ing activity in defense policy areas should logically be
coincident with programs of a strategic or tactical nature.
It is in these areas that are found the weapons programs
which account for the major development and procurement ex-
penditures, (i.e. F-14, F-15, B-l, CVN, etc). The findings
do suggest however that the trend in SASC activity is appar-
ently towards more involvement with the conduct and control
of these systems.
2. Overall Trend of SASC Activity
A direct adjunct to the Fiscal and Programmatic
question is an examination of the overall level of activity
involving the SASC. Figure 6 reveals the trend of activity
during the period examined and suggests that the committee
has assumed an increasingly active posture in the authoriza-
tions process. The annual level of activity, as expressed
in total actions increased from a single major effort in
FY 1968 (the FDL debate) to 52 actions in FY 1974. This
trend, when taken with the findings above, tends to support
the thesis that the SASC is no longer a "rubber-stamp" for
administration requests.
3. SASC Role in Authorization Process
In order to gain an appreciation for the liberal
(i.e. change-oriented) or critical role played by the SASC
in the authorization process, the administration request,
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amounts were compared for the period examined. Table V re-
flects the authorization amounts for each of the above areas
4
and Figure 7 graphically details the findings. The budget
authority used in Table V and Figure 7 were taken from the
Congressional Quarterly Almanac for the fiscal years involved,
During the period examined the average change from
the administration request, 'as passed by the House, was
-1.25%. In contrast the same average, when applied to SASC
recommendations, was -5.2%. (The averages do not include
FY 1973 because of the controversial Southeast Asia Amend-
ment. ) These averages, coupled with the overall trend toward
larger reductions, tend to reflect a more critical, change-
oriented SASC.
This finding was further substantiated by a brief
review of the House Committee on Armed Services Reports .
These Reports reflect an increasing concern for cost-effec-
tive management of the major programs but lack to some de-
gree, the lengthy discussion on Programmatic aspects found
in the SASC Reports.
4
It should be noted that the amounts involved in these
presentations will differ from totals in Appendix A, and the
derivative tables and figures. This is due to the omission
of such aspects of the Reports as ABM funding, financing
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The author feels that the above analysis adequately
demonstrates the viability and validity of Content Analysis
as a technique for examining congressional behavior. Based
on the results above, it appears that the method is feasible
for operational application in addition to being useful in
an academic sense. Specifically, the approach could prove
useful as an augmenting source of information available to
the Congressional Liaison Offices of the service components.
The Reports and Hearings are readily available to these of-
fices and after analysis could provide material indicating
the mood and desires of the Congress. The obtained results
might then be used, in conjunction with other sources, to
further educate and prepare the Program Manager for commit-
tee briefings.
The Content Analysis methodology is not original, how-
ever this effort does represent a "first-cut" at applying
the technique to specific committee behavior. As is the
case with any similar research, the initial application is
by no means definitive. Successive iterations should remove
biases that might be inadvertent products of a single effort,




B. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
Based on the research effort herein completed, it does
appear that the published Reports of the military committees
provide a valuable source of information which accurately
reflects Congress' motivations. The use of these Reports
would seem to provide a source of reference which activities
such as the Legislative Liaison Offices within the Navy, or
their inter-service counterparts, could use in preparing the
Program Managers for congressional hearings.
There is evidence that Program Managers, as a group, do
not understand the desires or mechanics of the committees
before which they must testify. It has been shown above
that, at least within the SASC, there is an environment of
stability, an increased augmentation of staff personnel and
a growing expertise within specific subcommittees. These
factors make it essential that the service components under-
stand the overall budgetary process within Congress and an-
ticipate the desires and orientation of the specific
committees which challenge the viability of defense programs
and strategies.
The need for more DOD-directed efforts at improving the
overall weapons acquisition process is obvious. Even the
most cursory examination of recorded congressional activity
cannot help but support this fact. Examples of committee
concern with cost-growth and management of weapons programs
are manifest. Actions such as the $100 million reduction
recommended by the SASC in FY 1974 [Ref. 29, p. 26], and the
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lengthy discussion directed toward Navy Shipbuilding prob-
lems during FY 1972 [Ref. 27, p. 27] are two examples of the
dissatisfaction and frustration associated with the acquisi-
tion process. These actions, when viewed in relation to the
increased Programmatic orientation and large budgetary ac-
tions involved, demand an increased effort on the part of
the services to interact in a more effective manner with
Congress.
Interactions with the major defense committees must pro-
vide honest, accurate and realistic appraisals of program
merit and progress if the required funding is to be granted.
This appears to be the only answer to avoiding punitive fis-
cal actions such as the B-l reduction cited above. Control
of budgetary authority by the SASC and Congress is a neces-
sary check in our political system. As such, program requests
and justifications must represent the true requirements of
National Defense.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
As mentioned above, this analysis represents a first at-
tempt to relate the method of Content Analysis to specific
committee behavior. An equally important area, and also one
that has a near-void of research efforts, is that of commit-
tee staff behavior and influence. This was alluded to above
but, as this thesis was concerned with explicit activity,
the staff was purposely avoided. It is not unreasonable to
assume, however, that the span of congressional involvement
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has necessitated a greater reliance on staff expertise and
resulted in a more powerful influence on the part of the




RECORDED DECISIONS FOR ANALYSIS: FY 1968 - FY 1974
No. FY








1. 68 N FDL -301. 1M 5,6 FP P
2. 69 N F-111B -225. 8M 2,3 DEV P
3. 69 N Missiles - 31. 0M 2 FI F
4. 69 N EA-6B RA 22. 8M 4 TP P
5. 69 N DXGN RA 52. 0M 5 CE F
6. 69 N SSN + 13. 5M 5,6 SP P
7. 70 A Mohawk - 28. 1M 13 FI F
8. 70 A Cheyenne -429. OM 6 DOD OTHER
9. 70 N A-7E -104. OM 3,4,18 CE F
10. 70 N CH-46E - 18. OM 17 FI F
11. 70 AF A-7D/F-4E -374.7/+374.7 3,4 CE F
12. 70 AF A-37B - 22. 5M 20 CE F
13. 70 AF T-X - 21. 5M 20 FI F
14. 70 AF Acft Mod. - 40. OM 20 DOD OTHER
15. 70 AF Acft Spares - 50. OM 20 DEV P
16. 70 A Tow Missile - 14. OM 21,22 DOD OTHER
17. 70 A Hawk Missile - 9.2M 22 DEV P
18. 70 A Interragator - 8.5M 2.2 DEV P
19. 70 A Launcher - 3.5M 22 DEV P
20. 70 AF SRAM - 20. 4M 25 DOD OTHER
21. 70 N SSN +123. 5M 7,8 SP P
22. 70 N FDL -186. 7M 36 FP P
23. 70 A Tracked Veh/
Equipt.
- 5.1M 38 FI F
24. 70 A M60A1 Tank - 20. OM 40 CE F
25. 70 A Range Finder - 3.8M 40 DEV P
26. 71 A Acft - 2.4M 32 FI F
27. 71 N Acft - 35. 5M 36 FI F











29. 71 A Missiles - 8.0M 45 FI F
30. 71 N Missiles - 7.5M 48 FI F
31. 71 AF Missiles - 14. 0M 54 FI F
32. 71 N Ship Bldg/Conv . -150. 0M 60 FI F
33. 71 A Tracked Veh. - 1.0M 63 FI F
34. 71 A Other Weapons - 1.0M 68 FI F
35. 71 AF C-5A RA622.2M 16-18 FM P
36. 71 A M60A1 Tank - 10. 9M 23 CE F
37. 71 A M60A1E2 - 12. 1M 23 DEV P
38. 71 A MBT-70 RA 77. 0M 24 DOD OTHER
39. 71 AF A-X RA 27. 9M 24 PM F
40. 71 A Cheyenne - 17. 6M 25 DEV P
41. 71 A Adv. Helo - 4.0M 25 FI F
42. 71 A Tow Missile RA111.2M 26 TP P
43. 71 AF F--15 RA370.0M 26 FM P
44. 71 N F-14 - 5 . 2M 27 PM F
45. 71 N F-14 RA977.0M 27 TP P
46. 71 AF F-111D - 6 . 4M 27,28 IR F
47. 71 AF B-l - 50. 0M 29 FI F
48. 71 N S-3A - 79. OM 33 IR F
49. 71 AF Int'l Fighter - 30. OM 37 FI F
50. 71 A Hawk Missile - 37. OM 44 DEV P
51. 71 A Lance RA 33. 8M 44 CE F
52. 71 N Sparrow - 6.7M 46 PM F
53. 71 MC Hawk - 14. 8M 49 DEV P
54. 71 AF Maverick + 3.1M 51,52 PM F
55. 71 AF Falcon - 15. OM 52 PM F
56. 71 N CVAN -152. OM 56 DEV P
57. 71 N SSN -188. 5M 56 FI F
58. 71 N Suh Tender -102. OM 56 FI F
59. 71 N Dest Tender -103. OM 56 FI F
60. 71 N Rescue Ship - 7 . 5M 56 FI F












62. 71 N Service Craft - 24. 0M 56 FI F
63. 71 MC LVTP-7 - 1.3M 64 DOD OTHER
64. 72 AF F-lll RA485.7M 29 PM F
65. 72 AF C-5 - 75. 8M 29,30 PM F
66. 72 N F-14 +801. 6M 31 TP P
67. 72 AF B-l RA370.3M 34 SP P
68. 72 AF SCAD RA 10. 0M 35 SP P
69. 72 A MBT-70 RA 62. 8M 37 TP P
70. 72 AF A-X RA 47. 0M 38 TP P
71. 72 MC AV-8A + 23. 7M 40 FP P
72. 72 A Cheyenne - 13. 2M 40 DEV P
73. 72 A Acft - 17. OM 43 FI F
74. 72 N EA-6B - 50. 6M 46 PM F
75. 72 N P3C - 51. OM 47 PM F
76. 72 N C-9 + 23. 1M 47 CE F
77. 72 N CT~3 Q - 3.8M 48 FT F
78. 72 N Acft Mod. - 1.3M 48 PM F
79. 72 AF C130E - 40. 8M 53 FI F
80. 72 N Sparrow + 2.6M 59 TP P
81. 72 AF Falcon - 5 . 5M 64 DOD OTHER
82. 72 AF Minuteman - 61. OM 64 DOD OTHER
83. 72 N SSN + 22. 5M 68 SP P
84. 72 N AS - 76. OM 69 DEV P
85. 72 N AOR - 56. 5M 69 DOD OTHER
86. 72 N ATS - 52. 6M 69 DOD OTHER
87. 72 N Escalation -155. 7M 69 DOD OTHER
88. 73 N F-14 RA570.1M 14-19 PM F
89. 73 AF C-5A -100. OM 21 FI F
90. 73 AF AABNCP -136. 8M 22 DEV P
91. 73 AF F-15 RA910.0M 23 FM P
92. 73 N CVN-70 RA299.0M 26 FM P
93. 73 N Trident - 20. OM 27 DOD OTHER










95. 73 AF A-X RA 48. 1M 35 PM F
96. 73 A Cheyenne - 58. 6M 36 DEV P
97. 73 MC AV-8A -133. 1M 36 DEV P
98. 73 A U-21 - 12. 7M 36 PM F
99. 73 N CT-39 - 7.9M 37 PM F
100. 73 AF CXX - 8.4M 37 PM F
101. 73 AF AWACS -309. 9M 38 DEV P
102. 73 AF OTH-B RA 4.4M 39 SP P
103. 73 A SAM-D RA171.4M 40 TP P
104. 73 A Vulcan - 15. 2M 40,48 DEV P
105. 73 N S-3A - 10. 2M 46 PM F
106. 73 N Acft Mods. - 20. 0M 40 PM F
107. 73 AF F-5E - 2.3M 51 FI F
108. 73 AF Acft Mods. - 40. 0M 40 PM F
109. 73 AF Minuteman - 27. 0M 63 PM F
1 1 o
-I- -L o •
"70 M DD963 -363, 0M 67 DOD OTHER
111. 73 N SCS - 10. 0M 68 DEV P
112. 73 N ATS - 26. 1M 68 FI F
113. 73 MC LVTE-7 - 7.7M 75 PM F
114. 74 N F-14 -505. 4M 13-15 PM F
115. 74 AF F-15 RA1,147.1M 15 FM P
116. 74 N CVN-70 RA657.0M 17 FM P
117. 74 MC AV-8A - 6.0M 18 CE F
118. 74 A Adv Helo - 3.5M 18 FI F
119. 74 AF A- 10 - 30. OM 20 DEV P
120. 74 ANG A-7D RA 70. 1M 21 FM P
121. 74 AF C-5A - 5.9M 22 DOD OTHER
122. 74 A Util Acft - 12. 2M 22 FI F
123. 74 AF Util Acft - 9.6M 22 FI F
124. 74 N Sidewinder - 1 . 5M 23 DEV P
125. 74 AF Laser Guided
Missiles
- 8 . OM 23 CE F
126. 74 N Bulldog + 12. 5M 24 CE F








128. 74 AF B-l -100. OM
129. 74 N T2C - 26. 1M
130. 74 AF SCAD - 72. 2M
131. 74 N SCM - 15. 2M
132. 74 A LADS - 42. 4M
133. 74 N CIWS - 8.0M
134. 74 N MK-22 - 0.8M
135. 74 A SAM-D RA194.2M
136. 74 N Trident RA 1,527. 4M
137. 74 AF AWACS - 42. 0M
138. 74 N EA-6B - 15. OM
139. 74 N A7E - 9.1M
140. 74 N A7E - 5.7M
141. 74 AF F-5A - 41. OM
142. 74 AF F-lll +158. 8M
143. 74 AF T-41D - . 1M
144. 74 AF UH-1H - 40. 2M
145. 74 AF Acft Mods. - 35. 5M
146. 74 AF Acft Spares - 9.3M
147. 74 AF GSE - 5.5M
148. 74 A Lance Missile - 4 . 7M
149. 74 A Pershing - 4.5M
150. 74 A ADCCS - 4 . 3M
151. 74 AF Minuteman - 45. 8M
152. 74 AF SRAM - 5 . 6M
153. 74 AF Maverick - 9.9M
154. 74 AF Shrike - 2.2M
155. 74 N SCS - 29. 3M
156. 74 N SSBN -113. 6M
157. 74 N DLG - 35. 6M
158. 74 N Escalation - 94. 6M
159. 74 A M60A1 Tank - 41. 4M















































































161. 74 N Captor
162. 74 A XM198
163. 74 A M60
164. 74 A M219








- = reduction or deletion
RA = recommend approval as requested
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